How R&D scores up for different countries.
Showing posts with label Shared. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Shared. Show all posts
Friday, February 28, 2014
Friday, November 22, 2013
Crystallography: Snowflakes
Images shared via Alexey Kljatov.
A Russian photographer, Alexey Kljatov created a self made camera-lens combination to take some inexpensive photographs of snowflakes that clearly show the crystallographic structure of each flake.
With each flake having undergone different thermodynamics, no two flakes are alike. What is interesting is that each flake shows the basic most thermodynamic concepts with respect to crystallography at a macro level.
The dendrites grow spaced from each other like leafs on a branch instead of a single solid being frozen because, at the seed's surface and the part yet liquid (solid-liquid interface) at the center, the temperature higher than it is in the solid or liquid due to temperature inversion. This means not only the dendrites tend to equally space away from each other but also grow further away from the interface deep into the liquid depending on the time they get to freeze. This results in the dendrites growing in a pattern of branch and leaf like structure so well, almost as if it was calculated before it was made. Well not almost... it was naturally calculated before it formed. It's thermodynamics in action. During freezing the latent heat of fusion given away by the freezing material is being exchanged at the solid-liquid interface which results in inversion of temperature in this region. The inversion simply denotes the raise in temperature above the freezing point as well as the ambient liquid temperature at the interface. Instead of the inversion of temperature slowing down the process, it instead gives the process a pattern. The material does not wait for this temperature to lower down as it finds a freezing opportunity on as a separate dendrite. Crystal starts forming and growing in shape of dendrites. Depending on what the localized thermodynamic conditions were, each flakes forms in different sizes and shapes, which is remarkably shown in the photography.
A Russian photographer, Alexey Kljatov created a self made camera-lens combination to take some inexpensive photographs of snowflakes that clearly show the crystallographic structure of each flake.
With each flake having undergone different thermodynamics, no two flakes are alike. What is interesting is that each flake shows the basic most thermodynamic concepts with respect to crystallography at a macro level.
The dendrites grow spaced from each other like leafs on a branch instead of a single solid being frozen because, at the seed's surface and the part yet liquid (solid-liquid interface) at the center, the temperature higher than it is in the solid or liquid due to temperature inversion. This means not only the dendrites tend to equally space away from each other but also grow further away from the interface deep into the liquid depending on the time they get to freeze. This results in the dendrites growing in a pattern of branch and leaf like structure so well, almost as if it was calculated before it was made. Well not almost... it was naturally calculated before it formed. It's thermodynamics in action. During freezing the latent heat of fusion given away by the freezing material is being exchanged at the solid-liquid interface which results in inversion of temperature in this region. The inversion simply denotes the raise in temperature above the freezing point as well as the ambient liquid temperature at the interface. Instead of the inversion of temperature slowing down the process, it instead gives the process a pattern. The material does not wait for this temperature to lower down as it finds a freezing opportunity on as a separate dendrite. Crystal starts forming and growing in shape of dendrites. Depending on what the localized thermodynamic conditions were, each flakes forms in different sizes and shapes, which is remarkably shown in the photography.
Tuesday, September 17, 2013
Pi - 3.14 - π
-- Compiled from multiple sources.
Pi (π) is an infinite, non-repeating (sic) decimal - meaning that every possible number combination exists somewhere in pi. Converted into ASCII text, somewhere in that infinite string if digits is the name of every person you will ever love, the date, time and manner of your death, and the answers to all the great questions of the universe.
It is not true that an infinite, non-repeating decimal must contain ‘every possible number combination’. The decimal 0.011000111100000111111 is an easy counterexample. However, if the decimal expansion of π contains every possible finite string of digits, which seems quite likely, then the rest of the statement is indeed correct. Of course, in that case it also contains numerical equivalents of every book that will never be written, among other things.
Let me summarize the things that have been said which are true and add one more thing.
In other words, a string which contains everything contains nothing. Useful communication is useful because of what it does not contain.
You should keep all of the above in mind and then read Jorge Luis Borges' The Library of Babel. (A library which contains every book contains no books.)
Pi (π) is an infinite, non-repeating (sic) decimal - meaning that every possible number combination exists somewhere in pi. Converted into ASCII text, somewhere in that infinite string if digits is the name of every person you will ever love, the date, time and manner of your death, and the answers to all the great questions of the universe.It is not true that an infinite, non-repeating decimal must contain ‘every possible number combination’. The decimal 0.011000111100000111111 is an easy counterexample. However, if the decimal expansion of π contains every possible finite string of digits, which seems quite likely, then the rest of the statement is indeed correct. Of course, in that case it also contains numerical equivalents of every book that will never be written, among other things.
Let me summarize the things that have been said which are true and add one more thing.
- π is not known to have this property, but it is expected to be true.
- This property does not follow from the fact that the decimal expansion of π is infinite and does not repeat.
In other words, a string which contains everything contains nothing. Useful communication is useful because of what it does not contain.
You should keep all of the above in mind and then read Jorge Luis Borges' The Library of Babel. (A library which contains every book contains no books.)
Friday, July 26, 2013
Pakistan develops smallest nuclear weapon the size of a tennis ball
Shared via Terminalx.
Over the past few years, Pakistan’s strategic forces, responsible for the country’s primary deterrence program, have been doing extensive research into the design and development of smart weapons i.e. nuclear weapons that have a dynamic and compact form, and which can easily be transported from one location to another.
Although a variety of warheads already exist, especially in northern Pakistan, these enhanced productions are considered a landmark in strategic deterrence, owing to their size and power. Sources for Terminal X revealed that Pakistan has taken the term ‘ special degree ’ one step ahead by developing what they call, “ the world’s smallest nuclear weapons ”.
Reportedly, these special weapons are about the size of a tennis ball (which can easily be hand-picked). Officials familiar with the development said that Pakistan’s Strategic Forces Command made it clear it has not signed any treaty preventing it from taking an aggressive reaction (in defence, when provoked or attacked by a hostile enemy).
It was said that if any mistake was made to initiate force aggression against Pakistan, then these ball-sized nuclear weapons will also be distributed across the Muslim world’s armed forces. In addition to these smart weapons , sources said that the Pakistani military has developed plutonium-based anti tank bullets which can prove very lethal for enemy armored vehicles, especially those of neighboring India.
TX has received information that a clandestine transfer protocol has been put into place for the past few years after discussions with a few allies, according to which, if in case Pakistan is attacked in the near future, threats of which are in increasing abundance, then the country’s strategic forces will initiate a plan-of-action by which the aforementioned smart weapons will be distributed among friendly armed forces in Africa, the Arab world and South Asia. Of interesting note in this regard is the claim that this entire process of “ emergency transfer and armed protocol ” can be completed from start to finish within 8 hours.
Over the past few years, Pakistan’s strategic forces, responsible for the country’s primary deterrence program, have been doing extensive research into the design and development of smart weapons i.e. nuclear weapons that have a dynamic and compact form, and which can easily be transported from one location to another.
Although a variety of warheads already exist, especially in northern Pakistan, these enhanced productions are considered a landmark in strategic deterrence, owing to their size and power. Sources for Terminal X revealed that Pakistan has taken the term ‘ special degree ’ one step ahead by developing what they call, “ the world’s smallest nuclear weapons ”.
Reportedly, these special weapons are about the size of a tennis ball (which can easily be hand-picked). Officials familiar with the development said that Pakistan’s Strategic Forces Command made it clear it has not signed any treaty preventing it from taking an aggressive reaction (in defence, when provoked or attacked by a hostile enemy).
It was said that if any mistake was made to initiate force aggression against Pakistan, then these ball-sized nuclear weapons will also be distributed across the Muslim world’s armed forces. In addition to these smart weapons , sources said that the Pakistani military has developed plutonium-based anti tank bullets which can prove very lethal for enemy armored vehicles, especially those of neighboring India.
TX has received information that a clandestine transfer protocol has been put into place for the past few years after discussions with a few allies, according to which, if in case Pakistan is attacked in the near future, threats of which are in increasing abundance, then the country’s strategic forces will initiate a plan-of-action by which the aforementioned smart weapons will be distributed among friendly armed forces in Africa, the Arab world and South Asia. Of interesting note in this regard is the claim that this entire process of “ emergency transfer and armed protocol ” can be completed from start to finish within 8 hours.
Drone hacking via GPS Spoofing; how Iran hacked the US drone
shared via Juggaar under CC-BY-NC-ND license.
The US
stealth drone was captured by Iran spoofing its GPS coordinates tricking
the bird to land within the Iranian territory instead of it's actual
programmed landing zone, Afghanistan. Iranian engineers, only a few
months back, claimed that the drone’s GPS was reconfigured which made it
land inside Iran.
According to the US officials, RQ in its name means that it is unarmed and some industry experts who have written about the Sentinel stealth is that its design makes it more of an operational platform not an intelligence gathering aircraft. It was used to fly support during the Bin Laden raid. However, according to the Iranian news, the drone was shot down and recovered almost completely intact which goes as a warning to the US.
According to an unnamed Iranian engineer who has been working on the US bat-wing RQ-170 Sentinel, the spoofing method used allowed the Iranians to divert the landing of the bird without even hacking into the remote-control signals of the US control centre.
The GPS weakness of aircraft has been a concern for US since a long time. Such an attack is much more sophisticated than ECM jamming due to being executed under cover and finding out the hacker is not possible until the spoofing has already been done. The attack method allows the GPS receiver to send wrong GPS signals which makes the drone believe that it is located somewhere in space while it is flying at its normal altitude, making it to reduce altitude and actually land. The US officials lay the claim of their loss of the stealth drone on a supposed malfunction from their end.
The Iranian engineer, however, claims the GPS navigation to be the weakest point. After being “jammed” by sending noise over the normal communications, the bird automatically goes into autopilot mode and doesn’t know what to do next. It can then be tricked and commanded into doing whatever the controller wants.
None of the current GPS systems are “spoof proof” due to several reasons. The main reason being the near impossibility to validate consistently on a “one way” communications channel because of “replay attacks”. Therefore all the GPS sytems require an additional channel that is not possible to jam.
Claims have also been made that Iran has sold the stealth to China so that China may undertake serious investigations on the other hand Pakistan is also believed to have shared with China, the stealth technology from the stealth helicopter that crashed in Abbottabad attack.
Thursday, July 25, 2013
Researchers create ‘an impossible material’ by mistake
shared via io9 and plosone under creative commons license.
In yet another example of scientific serendipity, Uppsala University researchers have created an unprecedented material with record-breaking properties. And most remarkable of all, this new material — which was thought impossible to make for over a century — was the result of an accident in the lab.
And indeed, the new magnesium carbonate material exhibits some remarkable properties.
a) Scanning electron microscope view of upsalite. Scale bar, 1 µm. b) Higher magnification SEM of a region in a) showing the textural porosity of the material. Scale bar, 200 nm. c) image of upsalite showing contrast consistent with a porous material. The image is recorded with under-focused conditions to enhance the contrast from the pores. Scale bar: 50 nm.
Once refined, upsalite could significantly reduce the amount of energy required to control environmental moisture in electronics and in drug delivery. It could also be used in hockey rinks and warehouses. Perhaps more crucially, the material could be used to suck up toxic waste, dangerous chemicals, and oil spills.
Scientists have known about natural and ordered forms of magnesium carbonate, both with and without water structure, for quite some time. But creating a water-free disordered version has proven difficult. As early as 1906, German researchers concluded that the material could not be created in the same way as other disordered carbonates, namely by bubbling C02 through an alcoholic suspension. Other studies in 1926 and 1961 came to the same conclusion.
'We started to get excited'
But on one fateful Thursday afternoon in 2011 this all changed. A research team led by Johan Goméz de la Torre made some slight changes to the synthesis parameters of an earlier unsuccessful attempt to create a water-free disordered form of magnesium carbonate — and they left it in the reaction chamber by mistake! It sat there for the entire weekend, and when the researchers returned to the lab the following Monday, a rigid gel had formed.
Surprised and excited, they dried the gel and studied it further. They soon realized that they were onto something.
After a year of further experiments and refinements, upsalite was born. The new material featured an adsoprtion capacity about 50% larger than that of comparable materials at low relative humidities, and an ability to retain more than 75% of the adsorbed water when the humidity was decreased from 95% to 5% at room temperature.
“This places the new material in the exclusive class of porous, high surface area materials including mesoporous silica, zeolites, metal organic frameworks, and carbon nanotubes”, noted researcher Maria Strømme through a release. Indeed, it can adsorb more water at low humidities than the best materials available — and with less energy. “This, together with other unique properties of the discovered impossible material is expected to pave the way for new sustainable products in a number of industrial applications”, said Strømme.
In yet another example of scientific serendipity, Uppsala University researchers have created an unprecedented material with record-breaking properties. And most remarkable of all, this new material — which was thought impossible to make for over a century — was the result of an accident in the lab.
And indeed, the new magnesium carbonate material exhibits some remarkable properties.
Adsorption, Not Absorption
Called upsalite in honor of the university where it was discovered, the material features a surface area of 800 square meters per gram. It's got the highest surface area measured for a synthesized alkali metal carbonate. And in addition, upsalite is filled with empty pores all having a diameter smaller than 10 nanometers.
This means that it can absorb — or more accurately, adsorb — more water at low relative humidities than the most advanced materials currently in existence.
Unlike absorption, where fluids permeate or are dissolved by a liquid or solid, adsorption involves the adhesion of atoms, ions, or molecules from a gas, liquid, or dissolved solid to a surface. And it does so as a consequence of surface energy (similar to surface tension).
Called upsalite in honor of the university where it was discovered, the material features a surface area of 800 square meters per gram. It's got the highest surface area measured for a synthesized alkali metal carbonate. And in addition, upsalite is filled with empty pores all having a diameter smaller than 10 nanometers.
This means that it can absorb — or more accurately, adsorb — more water at low relative humidities than the most advanced materials currently in existence.
Unlike absorption, where fluids permeate or are dissolved by a liquid or solid, adsorption involves the adhesion of atoms, ions, or molecules from a gas, liquid, or dissolved solid to a surface. And it does so as a consequence of surface energy (similar to surface tension).
a) Scanning electron microscope view of upsalite. Scale bar, 1 µm. b) Higher magnification SEM of a region in a) showing the textural porosity of the material. Scale bar, 200 nm. c) image of upsalite showing contrast consistent with a porous material. The image is recorded with under-focused conditions to enhance the contrast from the pores. Scale bar: 50 nm.
Once refined, upsalite could significantly reduce the amount of energy required to control environmental moisture in electronics and in drug delivery. It could also be used in hockey rinks and warehouses. Perhaps more crucially, the material could be used to suck up toxic waste, dangerous chemicals, and oil spills.
Scientists have known about natural and ordered forms of magnesium carbonate, both with and without water structure, for quite some time. But creating a water-free disordered version has proven difficult. As early as 1906, German researchers concluded that the material could not be created in the same way as other disordered carbonates, namely by bubbling C02 through an alcoholic suspension. Other studies in 1926 and 1961 came to the same conclusion.
'We started to get excited'
But on one fateful Thursday afternoon in 2011 this all changed. A research team led by Johan Goméz de la Torre made some slight changes to the synthesis parameters of an earlier unsuccessful attempt to create a water-free disordered form of magnesium carbonate — and they left it in the reaction chamber by mistake! It sat there for the entire weekend, and when the researchers returned to the lab the following Monday, a rigid gel had formed.
Surprised and excited, they dried the gel and studied it further. They soon realized that they were onto something.
After a year of further experiments and refinements, upsalite was born. The new material featured an adsoprtion capacity about 50% larger than that of comparable materials at low relative humidities, and an ability to retain more than 75% of the adsorbed water when the humidity was decreased from 95% to 5% at room temperature.
“This places the new material in the exclusive class of porous, high surface area materials including mesoporous silica, zeolites, metal organic frameworks, and carbon nanotubes”, noted researcher Maria Strømme through a release. Indeed, it can adsorb more water at low humidities than the best materials available — and with less energy. “This, together with other unique properties of the discovered impossible material is expected to pave the way for new sustainable products in a number of industrial applications”, said Strømme.
Friday, July 19, 2013
Applied sciences exclusive: Analyzing Pakistan's need for effective stealth countermeasures
by Faran Awais Butt via Terminalx. Shared under CC BY-NC-ND license 3.0.
Before I begin, I would like to familiarize the readers with two acronyms which I would use throughout this article: Electronic Counter Measure (ECM) and Electronic Counter Counter Measure (ECCM).
ECM is something that intends to disturb the normal working of a radar and ECCM refers to the efforts to overcome ECM. Jamming of the radar by noise or deception were the most notable amongst the ECMs but today, the radars of the world are under the threat of an even more sinister technology which is in possession of a very few countries; this technology, known as 'stealth', makes the target invisible to the radar. Stealth technology has brought up a revolution in the field of ECMs and has exposed the ineffectiveness of thousands of radars all across the world. The stealth aircrafts diffract and/or scatter very low power electromagnetic radiations owning to its special geometry and highly absorbent material. It is essential for the ground-based radars to have the capabilities of ECCM against stealth technology.
ECMs can be both seen and unseen. After World War II, there has been a significant research work on radar technology but as it progressed, its countermeasures also started to develop. The purpose of ECM is to make the radar less capable of detecting targets, deceiving the system and hence making it dysfunctional. It prevents the enemy radar from detecting the object. In reaction to ECM, there developed another form of electronic warfare which was developed as a reaction to ECM, known as ECCM i.e. electronic counter counter-measures of radar systems.
Electronic warfare is something in which every nation is trying to gain superiority at. There has been a rapid increase in sophistication of weapons in order to tackle the hostility of threats. ECCM is purely reactionary, that is, it has been developed in response to observed threats. If the ECM effects are observed in a specific system, a solution must be developed especially for a country like Pakistan which is under immense threat of this technology both from the western border (US, NATO forces) and India on the east.
Although stealth aircraft are in use and possess many qualities which make them superior to other fighter jets, however there still exist limitations to this technology. Many such aircraft are unstable and require a high-integrity sophisticated flight control and a fly-by-wire control system. The Radar Cross Section (RCS) of the aircraft is a parameter which dictates the detectability of the target. The greater the RCS, the easier it would be for the radar to detect it. Below 900 MHz, the target cross section increases exponentially. However, there is increased return from undesirable clutters. Shaping requirements have negative effect on the aerodynamics of the aircraft and hence they cannot be flown without a fly-by-wire control system. Hence, radar designers can exploit these vulnerabilities better than a mono-static radar since the bi-static RCS can be quite different depending upon target scattering characteristics.
The dramatic incident that took place on 2nd May 2011 at Abbottabad caused a humiliating disgrace to Pakistan when the United States' “modified” Blackhawk helicopters did a violation by covertly doing an operation at a strategically important location in Pakistan.
The report states that the latest stealth technology was used by the choppers employed in the raid. Helicopters with such technology are undetectable by ordinary radars.
The reports revealed that all of Pakistan Air Force's radar systems and technical monitoring assets were fully functional on 2nd May and no lapses of vigilance occurred that night on the part of the institution. This implies that there was lack of technology which resulted in the radars being unable to identify the incoming targets. It is evident thus, that radars are of no use if they cannot detect a target owing to ECM, which once again brings us to the conclusion that there needs to be an effective introduction of ECCMs into the system.
There is a global trend of using monostatic radars i.e. radars which have the same antenna which acts both as a transmitter/receiver and a duplexer which separates the signal. On the other hand, a bistatic radar is one in which there is a separate transmitter/receiver and the distance of the receiver should be considerable to the distance between radar and target. This trend needs to be changed for all the possible stealth-affected countries like Pakistan.
Stealth-oriented structures usually do not reflect the incoming wave in the same direction, rather they are absorbed and also scattered in different directions away from the radar.
These locations can be covered by use of multiple receivers at various locations. Pakistan should look for bistatic or a multi-static radar systems which have separated transmitters and receivers and whose receivers are located at a location comparable to the target’s distance.
Russia’s Sukhoi and Hindustan Aeronautics limited (HAL) are working on a project, 'Perspective Multi-role Fighter' (PMF), whose objective is to make Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA); these planes are expected to be in operation by 2015. India too, is working on autonomous unmanned combat air vehicles developed by the Defence Research & Development Organization (DRDO) for the Air Force.
Having already unveiled the J-20 Chengdu stealth fighter in January 2011, China is the only country which is developing two separate stealth fighters. The US is developing the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter in three versions; Russia is working on a single design, the 'PAK-FA', on which India is also collaborating. Separately, Japan is developing the ATD-X demonstrator.
Pakistan has a very fine air defence system against jamming techniques but there is a need to make efforts to overcome the threats of stealth. India has been working on stealth in collaboration with Russia where as Pakistan did not make any efforts to bring stealth technology to their system. Pakistan should seriously consider collaboration with China in the manufacturing of the'Mighty Dragon' J-20.
Efforts should be made by Pakistan to bring affordable stealth capabilities to their system. Although it must be acknowledged that this can take a lot of time. Pakistan should instead make efforts to build or design the counter to stealth system. The best radar that Pakistan has is the American TPS-77 which is a phased array radar. Phased array radars have many transmit/receive modules and such radars are very good in countering different types of noise jamming and to some extent, deception jamming. It also has a great deal of graceful degradation and room for modification according to situation.
Active phased array radars should be deployed since in such systems, there is a separate transmit/receive module which can be modified to have varied polarization, bandwidth and even operating frequency. Pakistan should look to work on active phased array systems in the radar factories at Kamra. Pakistan should also look to utilize radars operating on the lower side of L band of radar on the borders. Since building a multi-static radar approach could be very costly, we can either use modified radar warning receivers on a temporary basis or build a low cost multi-static radar system indigenously.
Tuesday, July 9, 2013
Friday, June 7, 2013
First woman in space ready for ‘one-way flight to Mars'
Shared via Rianovosti.
STAR CITY, MOSCOW REGION, June 7 (RIA Novosti) – Valentina Tereshkova, the first woman in space, said Friday that she disapproved of space tourists and would be prepared to leave retirement to undertake a one-way trip to Mars, her favorite planet.
Tereshkova, 76, was speaking ahead of the 50th anniversary of her June 16, 1963, blastoff, which propelled her into the record books and made her one of the Soviet Union’s most feted astronauts.
“Of course, it’s a dream to go to Mars and find out whether there was life there or not,” Tereshkova said. “If there was, then why did it die out? What sort of catastrophe happened?”
While she said that she thought the first manned flight to Mars would be a suicide trip, she volunteered to take part. “I am ready,” she said.
Tereshkova spent three days orbiting the Earth in 1963 and is one of only three female Russian astronauts to have taken part in a space mission, compared with over 50 of their counterparts in the United States.
Not all aspects of modern space flight are to Tereshkova’s taste. She said the privilege of going into space should be reserved for scientists and professional astronauts, and not be available to the highest bidder.
There have been eight space tourists since 2001, with each cosmic jaunt costing upward of $20 million.
“Only specialists should be making space flights because, while there have been a lot of flights and more than 50 astronauts, there is still a lot that hasn’t been studied,” Tereshkova said. “But if they [the people going into space] are specialists, if they can bring some use working aboard a spaceship, then be my guest.”
Tereshkova was part of a small team of women assembled by the Soviet authorities as potential astronauts in the wake of the first manned space flight by Yury Gagarin in 1961, but she was the only one who actually went into space. The next Russian woman to do so, Svetlana Savitskaya, blasted off 19 years later, in 1982.
Tereshkova, whose call sign was "Seagull," also revealed a secret about her pioneering space flight: that a technical error almost precipitated disaster when she was about to re-enter the Earth's atmosphere.
On landing, Tereshkova said she was approached by Sergei Korolyov, the father of the Soviet space program, who addressed her as "my little seagull" and begged her not to reveal the mistake.
"So I kept the secret for exactly 30 years," Tereshkova said.
STAR CITY, MOSCOW REGION, June 7 (RIA Novosti) – Valentina Tereshkova, the first woman in space, said Friday that she disapproved of space tourists and would be prepared to leave retirement to undertake a one-way trip to Mars, her favorite planet.
Tereshkova, 76, was speaking ahead of the 50th anniversary of her June 16, 1963, blastoff, which propelled her into the record books and made her one of the Soviet Union’s most feted astronauts.
“Of course, it’s a dream to go to Mars and find out whether there was life there or not,” Tereshkova said. “If there was, then why did it die out? What sort of catastrophe happened?”
While she said that she thought the first manned flight to Mars would be a suicide trip, she volunteered to take part. “I am ready,” she said.
Tereshkova spent three days orbiting the Earth in 1963 and is one of only three female Russian astronauts to have taken part in a space mission, compared with over 50 of their counterparts in the United States.
Not all aspects of modern space flight are to Tereshkova’s taste. She said the privilege of going into space should be reserved for scientists and professional astronauts, and not be available to the highest bidder.
There have been eight space tourists since 2001, with each cosmic jaunt costing upward of $20 million.
“Only specialists should be making space flights because, while there have been a lot of flights and more than 50 astronauts, there is still a lot that hasn’t been studied,” Tereshkova said. “But if they [the people going into space] are specialists, if they can bring some use working aboard a spaceship, then be my guest.”
Tereshkova was part of a small team of women assembled by the Soviet authorities as potential astronauts in the wake of the first manned space flight by Yury Gagarin in 1961, but she was the only one who actually went into space. The next Russian woman to do so, Svetlana Savitskaya, blasted off 19 years later, in 1982.
Tereshkova, whose call sign was "Seagull," also revealed a secret about her pioneering space flight: that a technical error almost precipitated disaster when she was about to re-enter the Earth's atmosphere.
On landing, Tereshkova said she was approached by Sergei Korolyov, the father of the Soviet space program, who addressed her as "my little seagull" and begged her not to reveal the mistake.
"So I kept the secret for exactly 30 years," Tereshkova said.
Sunday, June 2, 2013
Exclusive: Pakistan expresses interest in non-nuclear EMP weapons technology
by Zaki Khalid via Terminalx.
Well-informed sources say that Pakistani security officials have expressed interest in the research and development of non-nuclear EMP (electromagnetic pulse) weapons.
Sources privy to the development had earlier shared that a panel of Chinese and Russian experts had met in Moscow to discuss means of collaborating for a giant Asian EMP-shield ('umbrella') that would protect regional airspace, particularly that of Russia and China, from intruding systems.
In this context, Pakistani officials expressed their interest. It is expected that as previously, Pakistan will approach its counterparts in China to map a possible joint R & D venture.
Well-informed sources say that Pakistani security officials have expressed interest in the research and development of non-nuclear EMP (electromagnetic pulse) weapons.
Sources privy to the development had earlier shared that a panel of Chinese and Russian experts had met in Moscow to discuss means of collaborating for a giant Asian EMP-shield ('umbrella') that would protect regional airspace, particularly that of Russia and China, from intruding systems.
In this context, Pakistani officials expressed their interest. It is expected that as previously, Pakistan will approach its counterparts in China to map a possible joint R & D venture.
Tuesday, May 28, 2013
Pakistan’s nuclear bayonet
While Pakistan celebrates Youm-e-Takbir, I find it fitting to share this article about how nuclear weapons have impacted Pakistan and the region. Applied Sciences some times go far enough to envelope continents, or even the globe, into consequences. This article is a shares content of a Dawn News article considered to be a worth sharing and relevant implication of applied sciences in Pakistan.
In an enthusiastic moment, Napoleon is said to have remarked: “Bayonets are wonderful! One can do anything with them except sit on them!” Pakistan’s political and military establishment glows with similar enthusiasm about its nuclear weapons. Following the 1998 nuclear tests, it saw “The Bomb” as a panacea for solving Pakistan’s multiple problems. It became axiomatic that, in addition to providing total security, “The Bomb” would give Pakistan international visibility, help liberate Kashmir, create national pride and elevate the country’s technological status. But the hopes and goals were quite different from those of earlier days.
Back then, there was just one reason for wanting “The Bomb” — Indian nukes had to be countered by Pakistani nukes. Indeed, in 1965, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had uttered his famous statement about “The Bomb”: if India got it “then we shall have to eat grass and get one, or buy one, of our own.” In the famous Multan meeting that followed India’s victory in the 1971 war, Bhutto demanded from Pakistani scientists that they map out a nuclear weapons programme to counter India’s. Pakistan was pushed further into the nuclear arena by the Indian test of May 1974.
Although challenged again to equalise forces by a series of five Indian nuclear tests in May 1998, Pakistan was initially reluctant to test its own weapons for fear of international sanctions. Much soul-searching followed. But foolish taunts and threats by Indian leaders such as L K Advani and George Fernandes forced Pakistan over the edge that same month, a fact that India now surely regrets.
Pakistan’s nuclear success changed attitudes instantly. A super-confident military suddenly saw nuclear weapons as a talisman; having nukes-for-nukes became secondary. “The Bomb” became the means for neutralising India’s far larger conventional land, air and sea forces. This thinking soon translated into action. Just months after the 1998 nuclear tests, Pakistani troops and militants, protected by a nuclear shield, crossed the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir into Kargil. Militant Islamic groups freely organised across Pakistan. When the Mumbai attacks eventually followed in 2008, India could do little more than froth and fume.
A third purpose, which is still emerging, is subtler but critically important: our nukes generate income. Hard economic times have befallen Pakistan: loadshedding and fuel shortages routinely shut down industries and transport for long stretches, imports far exceed exports, inflation is at the double-digit level, foreign direct investment is negligible because of concerns over physical security, tax reform has failed, and corruption remains unchecked. An African country like Somalia or Congo would have long ago sunk under this weight. But, like nuclear North Korea, Pakistan feels protected. It knows that international financial donors are compelled to keep pumping in funds. Else a collapsing Pakistan would be unable to prevent its 80+ Hiroshima-sized nukes from disappearing into the darkness.
Over time, then, the country’s nuclear bayonet has gained more than just deterrence value; it is a dream instrument for any ruling oligarchy. Unlike Napoleon’s bayonet – painful to sit upon – nukes offer no such discomfort. Unsurprisingly, General (retd) Pervez Musharraf often referred to them as Pakistan’s “crown jewels”. One recalls that immediately after 9/11 he declared these “assets” were to be protected at all costs — even if this meant accepting American demands to dump the Taliban.
But can our nukes lose their magic? Be stolen, rendered impotent or lose the charm through which they bring in precious revenue? More fundamentally, how and when could they fail to deter?
A turning point could possibly come with Mumbai-II. This is no idle speculation. The military establishment’s reluctance to clamp down on anti-India jihadi groups, or to punish those who carried out Mumbai-I, makes a second Pakistan-based attack simply a matter of time. Although not officially assisted or sanctioned, it would create fury in India. What then? How would India respond?
There cannot, of course, be a definite answer. But it is instructive to analyse Operation Parakram, India’s response to the attack on the Indian parliament on December 13, 2001. This 10-month-long mobilisation of nearly half a million soldiers and deployment of troops along the LOC was launched to punish Pakistan for harbouring the Jaish-e-Mohammad, which, at least initially, had claimed responsibility for the attack. When Parakram fizzled out, Pakistan claimed victory and India was left licking its wounds.
A seminar held in August 2003 in Delhi brought together senior Indian military leaders and top analysts to reflect on Parakram. To quote the main speaker, Major-General Ashok Mehta, the two countries hovered on the brink of war and India’s “coercive diplomacy failed due to the mismatch of India-US diplomacy and India’s failure to think through the end game”. The general gave several reasons for not going to war against Pakistan. These included a negative cost-benefit analysis, lack of enthusiasm in the Indian political establishment, complications arising from the Gujarat riots of 2002 and “a lack of courage”. That Parakram would have America’s unflinching support also turned out to be a false assumption.
A second important opinion, articulated by the influential former Indian intelligence chief, Lieutenant-General Vikram Sood, was still harsher on India. He expressed regret at not going to war against Pakistan and said that India had “failed to achieve strategic space as well as strategic autonomy”. He went on to say that Musharraf never took India seriously after it lost this golden opportunity to attack a distracted Pakistan that was waging war against the Taliban on the Durand Line. Using the word “imbroglio” for India’s punitive attempt, he pointed out that no political directive had been provided to the service chiefs for execution even as late as August 2002. On the contrary, the Chief of Army Staff was asked to draw up a directive that month to extricate the army.
Now that the finger-pointing, recriminations and stock-taking are over, one can be sure that India will not permit a second Parakram. Indeed, a new paradigm for dealing with Pakistan has emerged and is encoded into strategies such as Cold Start. These call for quick, salami-slicing thrusts into Pakistan while learning to fight a conventional war under a “nuclear overhang” (by itself an interesting new phrase, used by General Deepak Kapoor in January 2010).
On this score, recent revelations by WikiLeaks are worthy of consideration. In a classified cable to Washington in February 2010, Tim Roemer, the US ambassador to India, described Cold Start as “not a plan for a comprehensive invasion and occupation of Pakistan” but “for a rapid, time- and distance-limited penetration into Pakistani territory”. He wrote that “it is the collective judgment of the US Mission that India would encounter mixed results.” Warning India against Cold Start, he concluded that “Indian leaders no doubt realise that although Cold Start is designed to punish Pakistan in a limited manner without triggering a nuclear response, they cannot be sure whether Pakistani leaders will in fact refrain from such a response.”
Roemer is spot on. Implementing Cold Start, which might be triggered by Mumbai-II, may well initiate a nuclear disaster. Indeed, there is no way to predict how such conflicts will end once they start. Therefore a rational Indian leadership – which one can only hope would exist at that particular time – is unlikely to opt for it. But even in this optimistic scenario, Mumbai-II would likely be a bigger disaster for Pakistan than for India. Yes, Pakistani nukes would be unhurt and unused, but their magic would have evaporated.
The reason is clear: an aggrieved India would campaign – with a high chance of success – for ending all international aid for Pakistan, a trade boycott and stiff sanctions. The world’s fear of loose Pakistani nukes hijacked by Islamist forces would be overcome by the international revulsion of yet another stomach-churning massacre. With little fat to spare in the economy, collapse may happen over weeks rather than months. Bravado in Pakistan would be intense at first but would fast evaporate.
Foodstuffs, electricity, gas and petrol would disappear. China and Saudi Arabia would send messages of sympathy and some aid, but they would not make up the difference. With scarcity all around, angry mobs would burn grid stations and petrol pumps, loot shops, and plunder the houses of the rich. Today’s barely governable Pakistan would become ungovernable. The government then in power, whether civilian or military, would exist only in name. Religious and regional forces would pounce upon their chances; Pakistan would descend into hellish anarchy.
In another scenario, could Pakistan’s nukes be stolen by Islamist radicals? America’s worries about this are dismissed by most Pakistanis who consider these fears to be unfounded and suspect such US claims to be hiding bad intent. They point out that the professionalism of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which has custodial responsibility of the weapons, has been praised by many visitors. Reassuring words have also come from visiting American politicians like Senator Joe Lieberman. With US tutoring and funds, SPD says it has implemented various technical precautions such as improved perimeter security, installation of electronic locks and security devices such as Permissive Action Links, and a personnel reliability programme.
For all this, procedures and technical fixes are only as good as the men who operate them. For example, more or better weapons could not have prevented Governor Salmaan Taseer from being gunned down by his own guards. This incident, as well as numerous insider attacks upon the military and Inter-Services Intelligence, raise the spectre of a mutiny in nuclear quarters. Given Pakistan’s radicalised and trenchantly anti-American environment, it is hard to argue that this would be impossible in a state of crisis.
Since the nukes may not be safe from radicals, it is logical to assume that the US must have extensively war-gamed the situation. Contingency plans would be put into operation once there is actionable intelligence of Pakistan’s nukes getting loose, or if a radical regime takes over and makes overt threats. What could these plans be, and would they really work?
An article published in The New Yorker in November 2009 by Seymour Hersh created waves in Pakistan. He wrote that US emergency plans exist for taking the sting out of Pakistan’s nukes by seizing their trigger mechanisms. He also claimed that an alarm, apparently related to a missing nuclearbomb component, had caused a US rapid response team to fly to Dubai. The alarm proved false and the team was recalled before it reached Pakistan. The Pakistan foreign ministry, as well as the US embassy in Islamabad, vigorously denied any such episode.
What should one make of Hersh’s claim? First, it is highly unlikely that the US has accurate knowledge of the storage locations of Pakistan’s nukes, especially since they (or look-alike dummies) are mobile. Extensive underground tunnels reportedly exist within which they can be freely moved. Second, even if a location is exactly known, it would be heavily guarded. This implies many casualties on both sides when intruding troops are engaged, thus making a secret operation impossible. Third, attacking a Pakistani nuclear site would be an act of war with totally unacceptable consequences for the US, particularly in view of its Afghan difficulties. All of this suggests that Hersh’s source of information was defective.
How would the US actually react to theft? Ill-informed TV anchors have screamed hysterically about Blackwater and US forces descending to grab the country’s nukes. But in a hypothetical crisis where the US has decided to take on Pakistan, its preferred military option would not be ground forces. Instead it would opt for precision Massive Ordnance Penetrator 30,000-pound bombs dropped by B-2 bombers or fry the circuit boards of the warheads using short, high-energy bursts of microwave energy from low-flying aircraft. But deeply buried warheads, or those with adequate metallic shielding, would still remain safe.
A US attack on Pakistan’s nuclear production or storage sites would, however, be monumental stupidity. Even if a single nuke escapes destruction, that last one could cause catastrophic damage. But the situation is immensely more uncertain and dangerous than a single surviving nuke. Even if the US knows the precise numbers of deployed weapons, it simply cannot know all their position coordinates. India, one imagines, would know even less.
Hence the bottom line: there is no way for any external power, whether America or India, to effectively deal with Pakistan’s nukes. Is this good news? Yes and no. While nuclear survivability increases Pakistani confidence and prevents dangerous knee-jerk reactions, it has also encouraged adventurism — the consequences of which Pakistan had to pay after Kargil.
An extremist takeover of Pakistan is probably no further than five to 10 years away. Even today, some radical Islamists are advocating war against America. But such a war would end Pakistan as a nation state even if no nukes are ever used. Saving Pakistan from religious extremism will require the army, which alone has power over critical decisions, to stop using its old bag of tricks. It must stop pretending that the threat lies across our borders when in fact the threat lies within. Napoleon’s bayonet ultimately could not save him, and Pakistan’s nuclear bayonet has also had its day. It cannot protect the country. Instead, Pakistan needs peace, economic justice, rule of law, tax reform, a social contract, education and a new federation agreement.
The author (Pervez Hoodbhoy) is professor of nuclear and high-energy physics at Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad.
In an enthusiastic moment, Napoleon is said to have remarked: “Bayonets are wonderful! One can do anything with them except sit on them!” Pakistan’s political and military establishment glows with similar enthusiasm about its nuclear weapons. Following the 1998 nuclear tests, it saw “The Bomb” as a panacea for solving Pakistan’s multiple problems. It became axiomatic that, in addition to providing total security, “The Bomb” would give Pakistan international visibility, help liberate Kashmir, create national pride and elevate the country’s technological status. But the hopes and goals were quite different from those of earlier days.
Back then, there was just one reason for wanting “The Bomb” — Indian nukes had to be countered by Pakistani nukes. Indeed, in 1965, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had uttered his famous statement about “The Bomb”: if India got it “then we shall have to eat grass and get one, or buy one, of our own.” In the famous Multan meeting that followed India’s victory in the 1971 war, Bhutto demanded from Pakistani scientists that they map out a nuclear weapons programme to counter India’s. Pakistan was pushed further into the nuclear arena by the Indian test of May 1974.
Although challenged again to equalise forces by a series of five Indian nuclear tests in May 1998, Pakistan was initially reluctant to test its own weapons for fear of international sanctions. Much soul-searching followed. But foolish taunts and threats by Indian leaders such as L K Advani and George Fernandes forced Pakistan over the edge that same month, a fact that India now surely regrets.
Pakistan’s nuclear success changed attitudes instantly. A super-confident military suddenly saw nuclear weapons as a talisman; having nukes-for-nukes became secondary. “The Bomb” became the means for neutralising India’s far larger conventional land, air and sea forces. This thinking soon translated into action. Just months after the 1998 nuclear tests, Pakistani troops and militants, protected by a nuclear shield, crossed the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir into Kargil. Militant Islamic groups freely organised across Pakistan. When the Mumbai attacks eventually followed in 2008, India could do little more than froth and fume.
A third purpose, which is still emerging, is subtler but critically important: our nukes generate income. Hard economic times have befallen Pakistan: loadshedding and fuel shortages routinely shut down industries and transport for long stretches, imports far exceed exports, inflation is at the double-digit level, foreign direct investment is negligible because of concerns over physical security, tax reform has failed, and corruption remains unchecked. An African country like Somalia or Congo would have long ago sunk under this weight. But, like nuclear North Korea, Pakistan feels protected. It knows that international financial donors are compelled to keep pumping in funds. Else a collapsing Pakistan would be unable to prevent its 80+ Hiroshima-sized nukes from disappearing into the darkness.
Over time, then, the country’s nuclear bayonet has gained more than just deterrence value; it is a dream instrument for any ruling oligarchy. Unlike Napoleon’s bayonet – painful to sit upon – nukes offer no such discomfort. Unsurprisingly, General (retd) Pervez Musharraf often referred to them as Pakistan’s “crown jewels”. One recalls that immediately after 9/11 he declared these “assets” were to be protected at all costs — even if this meant accepting American demands to dump the Taliban.
But can our nukes lose their magic? Be stolen, rendered impotent or lose the charm through which they bring in precious revenue? More fundamentally, how and when could they fail to deter?
A turning point could possibly come with Mumbai-II. This is no idle speculation. The military establishment’s reluctance to clamp down on anti-India jihadi groups, or to punish those who carried out Mumbai-I, makes a second Pakistan-based attack simply a matter of time. Although not officially assisted or sanctioned, it would create fury in India. What then? How would India respond?
There cannot, of course, be a definite answer. But it is instructive to analyse Operation Parakram, India’s response to the attack on the Indian parliament on December 13, 2001. This 10-month-long mobilisation of nearly half a million soldiers and deployment of troops along the LOC was launched to punish Pakistan for harbouring the Jaish-e-Mohammad, which, at least initially, had claimed responsibility for the attack. When Parakram fizzled out, Pakistan claimed victory and India was left licking its wounds.
A seminar held in August 2003 in Delhi brought together senior Indian military leaders and top analysts to reflect on Parakram. To quote the main speaker, Major-General Ashok Mehta, the two countries hovered on the brink of war and India’s “coercive diplomacy failed due to the mismatch of India-US diplomacy and India’s failure to think through the end game”. The general gave several reasons for not going to war against Pakistan. These included a negative cost-benefit analysis, lack of enthusiasm in the Indian political establishment, complications arising from the Gujarat riots of 2002 and “a lack of courage”. That Parakram would have America’s unflinching support also turned out to be a false assumption.
A second important opinion, articulated by the influential former Indian intelligence chief, Lieutenant-General Vikram Sood, was still harsher on India. He expressed regret at not going to war against Pakistan and said that India had “failed to achieve strategic space as well as strategic autonomy”. He went on to say that Musharraf never took India seriously after it lost this golden opportunity to attack a distracted Pakistan that was waging war against the Taliban on the Durand Line. Using the word “imbroglio” for India’s punitive attempt, he pointed out that no political directive had been provided to the service chiefs for execution even as late as August 2002. On the contrary, the Chief of Army Staff was asked to draw up a directive that month to extricate the army.
Now that the finger-pointing, recriminations and stock-taking are over, one can be sure that India will not permit a second Parakram. Indeed, a new paradigm for dealing with Pakistan has emerged and is encoded into strategies such as Cold Start. These call for quick, salami-slicing thrusts into Pakistan while learning to fight a conventional war under a “nuclear overhang” (by itself an interesting new phrase, used by General Deepak Kapoor in January 2010).
On this score, recent revelations by WikiLeaks are worthy of consideration. In a classified cable to Washington in February 2010, Tim Roemer, the US ambassador to India, described Cold Start as “not a plan for a comprehensive invasion and occupation of Pakistan” but “for a rapid, time- and distance-limited penetration into Pakistani territory”. He wrote that “it is the collective judgment of the US Mission that India would encounter mixed results.” Warning India against Cold Start, he concluded that “Indian leaders no doubt realise that although Cold Start is designed to punish Pakistan in a limited manner without triggering a nuclear response, they cannot be sure whether Pakistani leaders will in fact refrain from such a response.”
Roemer is spot on. Implementing Cold Start, which might be triggered by Mumbai-II, may well initiate a nuclear disaster. Indeed, there is no way to predict how such conflicts will end once they start. Therefore a rational Indian leadership – which one can only hope would exist at that particular time – is unlikely to opt for it. But even in this optimistic scenario, Mumbai-II would likely be a bigger disaster for Pakistan than for India. Yes, Pakistani nukes would be unhurt and unused, but their magic would have evaporated.
The reason is clear: an aggrieved India would campaign – with a high chance of success – for ending all international aid for Pakistan, a trade boycott and stiff sanctions. The world’s fear of loose Pakistani nukes hijacked by Islamist forces would be overcome by the international revulsion of yet another stomach-churning massacre. With little fat to spare in the economy, collapse may happen over weeks rather than months. Bravado in Pakistan would be intense at first but would fast evaporate.
Foodstuffs, electricity, gas and petrol would disappear. China and Saudi Arabia would send messages of sympathy and some aid, but they would not make up the difference. With scarcity all around, angry mobs would burn grid stations and petrol pumps, loot shops, and plunder the houses of the rich. Today’s barely governable Pakistan would become ungovernable. The government then in power, whether civilian or military, would exist only in name. Religious and regional forces would pounce upon their chances; Pakistan would descend into hellish anarchy.
In another scenario, could Pakistan’s nukes be stolen by Islamist radicals? America’s worries about this are dismissed by most Pakistanis who consider these fears to be unfounded and suspect such US claims to be hiding bad intent. They point out that the professionalism of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which has custodial responsibility of the weapons, has been praised by many visitors. Reassuring words have also come from visiting American politicians like Senator Joe Lieberman. With US tutoring and funds, SPD says it has implemented various technical precautions such as improved perimeter security, installation of electronic locks and security devices such as Permissive Action Links, and a personnel reliability programme.
For all this, procedures and technical fixes are only as good as the men who operate them. For example, more or better weapons could not have prevented Governor Salmaan Taseer from being gunned down by his own guards. This incident, as well as numerous insider attacks upon the military and Inter-Services Intelligence, raise the spectre of a mutiny in nuclear quarters. Given Pakistan’s radicalised and trenchantly anti-American environment, it is hard to argue that this would be impossible in a state of crisis.
Since the nukes may not be safe from radicals, it is logical to assume that the US must have extensively war-gamed the situation. Contingency plans would be put into operation once there is actionable intelligence of Pakistan’s nukes getting loose, or if a radical regime takes over and makes overt threats. What could these plans be, and would they really work?
An article published in The New Yorker in November 2009 by Seymour Hersh created waves in Pakistan. He wrote that US emergency plans exist for taking the sting out of Pakistan’s nukes by seizing their trigger mechanisms. He also claimed that an alarm, apparently related to a missing nuclearbomb component, had caused a US rapid response team to fly to Dubai. The alarm proved false and the team was recalled before it reached Pakistan. The Pakistan foreign ministry, as well as the US embassy in Islamabad, vigorously denied any such episode.
What should one make of Hersh’s claim? First, it is highly unlikely that the US has accurate knowledge of the storage locations of Pakistan’s nukes, especially since they (or look-alike dummies) are mobile. Extensive underground tunnels reportedly exist within which they can be freely moved. Second, even if a location is exactly known, it would be heavily guarded. This implies many casualties on both sides when intruding troops are engaged, thus making a secret operation impossible. Third, attacking a Pakistani nuclear site would be an act of war with totally unacceptable consequences for the US, particularly in view of its Afghan difficulties. All of this suggests that Hersh’s source of information was defective.
How would the US actually react to theft? Ill-informed TV anchors have screamed hysterically about Blackwater and US forces descending to grab the country’s nukes. But in a hypothetical crisis where the US has decided to take on Pakistan, its preferred military option would not be ground forces. Instead it would opt for precision Massive Ordnance Penetrator 30,000-pound bombs dropped by B-2 bombers or fry the circuit boards of the warheads using short, high-energy bursts of microwave energy from low-flying aircraft. But deeply buried warheads, or those with adequate metallic shielding, would still remain safe.
A US attack on Pakistan’s nuclear production or storage sites would, however, be monumental stupidity. Even if a single nuke escapes destruction, that last one could cause catastrophic damage. But the situation is immensely more uncertain and dangerous than a single surviving nuke. Even if the US knows the precise numbers of deployed weapons, it simply cannot know all their position coordinates. India, one imagines, would know even less.
Hence the bottom line: there is no way for any external power, whether America or India, to effectively deal with Pakistan’s nukes. Is this good news? Yes and no. While nuclear survivability increases Pakistani confidence and prevents dangerous knee-jerk reactions, it has also encouraged adventurism — the consequences of which Pakistan had to pay after Kargil.
An extremist takeover of Pakistan is probably no further than five to 10 years away. Even today, some radical Islamists are advocating war against America. But such a war would end Pakistan as a nation state even if no nukes are ever used. Saving Pakistan from religious extremism will require the army, which alone has power over critical decisions, to stop using its old bag of tricks. It must stop pretending that the threat lies across our borders when in fact the threat lies within. Napoleon’s bayonet ultimately could not save him, and Pakistan’s nuclear bayonet has also had its day. It cannot protect the country. Instead, Pakistan needs peace, economic justice, rule of law, tax reform, a social contract, education and a new federation agreement.
The author (Pervez Hoodbhoy) is professor of nuclear and high-energy physics at Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad.
Rocket-powered bicycle with a new land speed record
Discovery news has recently reported of a hydrogen peroxide strapped bike to have created a land speed record of 163 MPH.
Breaking the record of the previous rocket powered bicycle, Gissy has been able to set a new mark at an empty strip of highway in Munchhouse, France.
See the original post for more.
Breaking the record of the previous rocket powered bicycle, Gissy has been able to set a new mark at an empty strip of highway in Munchhouse, France.
See the original post for more.
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